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Will artificially intelligent expert systems necessarily serve to 
amplify human intelligence? Or will they simply create another wave of 
technological displacement? What types of occupations will be affected? 
What effects will these technologies have on developing human expertise? 
THE IXCHNOLOGICAL OBSOLESCENCE OF MEDIOCRITY 
Ronald M. Lee 
mediocrity ... the quality of being mediocre; spec. a moderate or 
average degree of mental ability, talents, skill, or the like; mid- 
dling capacity, endowment, or accomplishment" - 0.E .D 
In an earlier issue, Joseph (1982) wrote of the possibilities of 
(human) intelligence amplification through the use of artificially intelli- 
gent machines. His article examined a variety of technological develop- 
ments which make this a possibility. However the question remains open 
as to how these developments will combine with human abilities to attain 
higher capacities of cognition. 
Artificial Intelligence research has always emphasized the similari- 
ties between the observable evidence of human cognition and the 
behavior of computer programs. The comparison has been used in two 
ways: one, as a psychological methodology, using computer programs as 
a possible model of human cognition; the other as an engineering orienta- 
tion, using human cognition as a model for building smarter computer 
systems. 
However, by accepting these similarities as the basis for combining 
computers and humans in a single category of 'cognitive entities,' we are 
likewise led to focus on their differences as well. 
On one hand, there is a fairly well developed literature (e.g., Miller 
1956, Tversky and Kahneman 1974, Simon 1981) which emphasizes the 
limitations of human cognition with respect to machines. These deal 
mainly with the limitations of short term memory, coupled with relatively 
slow sequenbal processing capability whch lead us (humans) to simplify 
problems by abstracting their components into larger 'chunks,' and using 
short-cut heuristics to trim down the problem's complexity. 
On the other hand, another literature is emerging (e.g., Weizenbaum 
1976, H. Dreyfus 1979, S. Dreyfus 1981). which emphasizes the limita- 
tions of computational cognition as compared to that of humans. The 
general criticism is that computational techniques rely on atomistic 
representations of data and the sequential application of separate and 
exact inference rules whereas human (organic) cognition appears to store 
wholistic impressions and images and is capable of fuzzy* pattern match- 
ing between them which allows for great flexibility of association. 
This suggests a theory of cognitive complementarity between human 
and machines. 
Humans for instance require a great deal of discipline and training to 
perform the types of iterative calculations most easily programmed in 
machines. 
Contrariwise, the types of cognition whch  are basic even to human 
infants - erg. ,  recognizing faces and voices, acquisition of language - 
present deep, unsolved problems for computational theories. 
The middle area where humans and machines appear to be on com- 
parable footing is in so-called 'rule-based' system which form the general 
architecture of expert systems applications (see Davis and King (1975) or 
Nilson (1 980) for background). 
Rather than procedural programs where the computer executes 
instruction after instruction in a pre-determined order, these are non- 
procedural programs of un-ordered rules where the machine searches 
repeatedly through the rule set for the appropriate rules pertaining to a 
given situation. The non-determinism of this approach sacrifices much of 
the efficiency where the computer normally has advantage over the 
human. On the other hand, it provides considerably more flexibility and 
adaptability whch are the human's normal advantage. 
Stuart Dreyfus (1981) makes some interesting observations regard- 
ing rule-based cognition in the formation of human expertise. His claim 
is that the use of a small set  of discrete rules is characteristic of the 
novice stage in the development of a particular skill. As the individual 
becomes more experienced, these rules are gradually refined to incor- 
porate numerous exceptions. Additional experience adds a context 
dependent organization to the rules as well as  additional refinement so 
that the rules take on a much broader, parametric character. In the 
case of more advanced expertise, the individual rules give way to more 
wholistic patterns wbch are no longer processed in sequence but rather 
in a simultaneous pattern oriented manner. He suggests mundane exam- 
ples such as learning to drive a car  or playing chess. The novice driver 
learns to s h f t  at specified velocities, has certain fixed procedures for 
parallel parking, etc. Experienced drivers, on the other hand, no longer 
rely on these elementary measures but rather incorporate a wide variety 
of factors such as the sound of the engine, road incline and surface condi- 
tion, weather, anticipated traffic situations, etc.  A key point is that at  
* Fuzzy reasoning, once a pejorative term, has in recent years gained academic respectibili- 
ty. See Zadeh (1975). 
this level, most experienced drivers can no longer specify the individual 
factors and rules they use. 
Likewise most novice chess players begin with a simple point valua- 
tion scheme for each of the players and evaluate the value of an exchange 
through this numeric comparison. Subsequent development adds con- 
sideration of the relative position of pieces and their projected positions 
through scenarios of play and counter-play. Evidence of master level 
chess play however suggests a much more holistic orientation depending 
on comparative 'field of force' in actual and potential configurations of 
the pieces. 
Along these lines, a dimly recalled anecdote tells of well-known and 
widely recognized designer of electric motors. His fame grew to the point 
where he decided to write a book explaining how he did his designing. 
After the book was published, the quality of his subsequent designs 
declined. The conjecture is that he felt obligated to  follow the rules and 
methods of his book which somehow failed to capture the full capacity of 
his former expertise. 
The general hypothesis here is that the major impact of rule-based, 
expert systems will be at  these types of cognition characteristics of the 
early to middle level stages of human expertise development. 
These types of considerations from the basic design philosophy of 
so-called "decision support systems" e.g., Keen & Scott-Morton (1978),, 
Sprague & Fick (1980), Bonczek e t  al. (1 981). As opposed to expert sys- 
tems, which attempt to replicate the abilities of a human expert in a 
specific problem domain, the aim behind decision support systems is to 
arrive a t  a symbiotic combination between person and machne.  These 
have been of especial interest in management applications where deci- 
sions are a t  best only partially formalizable and continue to rely on 
experienced judgment. It is in these types of decision support applica- 
tions that the notation of intelligence amplification holds the most prom- 
ise. 
On the other hand, whle these developments have a certain exotic 
fascination, they also suggest a new wave of technological displacement. 
Rather than the typical victims such as clerks or factory workers, this 
wave threatens to  shake occupations of the middle level professional, e .g. ,  
in banking, law, medicine, public administration. 
A great deal of this intellectual activity is the application of esta- 
blished professional principles. While it often takes extensive specialized 
training to acquire these abilities, the very process of specialization tends 
to make these disciplines amenable to rule-based, automatable represen- 
tations. As observed in Lee (19B0), the Weberian concept of rationaliza- 
tion of organization has already become closely linked with automation. 
Supposing these developments do occur, what would be the potential 
impact on expertise formation in these fields? 
We would like to think that by removing the more mechanical types 
of cognition, human abilities will be freed to address problems requiring 
higher levels of creativity and innovation. A social question is whether 
their are enough such challenging problems to go around. The 
corresponding psychological question is whether the displaced 
professionals will have the creative aptitude to address these challenges. 
There is a pedagogic issue here as well. If rule based cognition is an  
important initial stage in expertise acquisition, what will be the effect if 
this stage loses its rewards? Will this tend to block the development of 
further experts? 
The example of chess may provide us the first experimental evi- 
dence. The more sophisticated compute chess programs now approach 
"expert" (in chess terminology) levels of play. The most advanced "mas- 
ters" level chess players continue relatively unchallenged by these 
machines. Nonetheless it now takes a minimum of several years concen- 
trated chess study to beat a machine. Even the inexpensive commer- 
cially marketed chess machines are a match for intermediate level 
players. What effect will this have for potential chess students? Will they 
be challenged or merely discouraged? 
What would be the effect if the problem domain were law or engineer- 
ing and the only jobs available are beyond the machine's capability? Will 
short term intelligence amplification become long term intelligence stag- 
nation? 
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